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April 26 2012
Hacker accessed account names, handles, and encrypted passwords, at least some of which were decrypted
File produced in litigation discovery erroneously contained registered voters' full Social Security numbers
April 25 2012
Printed documents containing protected patient information stolen from chief of psychiatry's car
Documents with 721 patients' names, addresses, phone numbers and Social Security numbers and diagnoses found in a former AF member's home
April 23 2012
Laptop stolen from car contained patients' information
April 20 2012
Unencrypted thumb drive containing employees' names, Social Security numbers and salary info lost in the mail by auditor
Doctor forgot to de-identify 7,000 patients' data before sending it out for financial analysis
April 19 2012
Employee working in the Medicaid program inappropriately transferred personal information of 228,435 Medicaid beneficiaries to his personal email account
Three paper Thursday: Shamir x3 at Eurocrypt
For the past 4 days Cambridge has been hosting Eurocrypt 2012.
There were many talks, probably interesting, but I will only comment on 3 talks given by Adi Shamir, 1 during the official conference and 2 during the rump session.
Among the other sessions I mention that the best paper was given to this paper by Antoine Joux and Vanessa Vitse for the enhancement of index calculus to break elliptic curves.
Official Talk: Minimalism in cryptography, the Even-Mansour scheme revisited
In this work, Adi et al. presented an analysis on the Even-Mansour scheme:
E(P) = F(P ⊕ K1) ⊕ K2
Such scheme, some times referred to as key whitening, is used in the DESX construction and in the AES-XTS mode of operation (just a few examples).
Adi et al. shown a new slide attack, called SLIDEX, which has been used to prove a tight bound on the security of the Even-Mansour scheme.
Even more, they show that using K1 = K2 you can achieve the same security.
Rump talk 1: security of multiple key encryption
Here Adi considered the case of encrypting data multiple times with multiple keys, as in 3DES:
data -> c1 = E_k1(data) -> c2 = E_k2(c1) -> c3 = E_k3(c2) -> c4 = E_k3(c3) …. and so on.
The general approach to break a scheme where a key is used 2 times or 3 times (2DES, 3DES for e.g.) is the meet-in-the-middle attack, where you encrypt from one side and then decrypt from the other side, and by storing a table of the size of the key space (say n bits) you can eventually find the keys used in a scheme using only a few pairs of plaintext/ciphertext. For 2 keys such an attack would require 2^{n} time, for 3 keys 2^{2n}. Therefore some people may assume that increasing the number of keys by 1 (i.e. to use 4 keys) may increase the security of this scheme. This is in fact not true.
Adi shown that once we go beyond 3 keys (e.g. 4, 5, 6, etc…) the security only increases once every few keys. If you think of it, using 4 keys you can just apply the meet-in-the-middle attack in 2^{2n} time to the left 2 encryptions and also in 2^{2n} time to the right 2 decryptions. After this, he shown how to use the meet-in-the-middle attack to solve the knapsack problem and proposed the idea of using such an algorithm to solve other problems as well.
Rump talk 2: the cryptography of John Nash
Apparently John Nash, member of MIT during the 1950s, wrote some letters to the NSA in 1955 explaining the implications of computational complexity for security (this wasn’t known at the time).
John Nach also sent a proposal for an encryption scheme that is similar with today’s stream ciphers. However the NSA’s replied saying that the scheme didn’t match the security requirements of the US.
Adi Shamir and Ron Rivest then analysed the scheme and found that in the known plaintext model it would require something like 2^{sqrt(n)} time to break (which John Nach considered not to be a polynomial time, and therefore assumed would be secure).
The letters are now declassified. This blog also comments on the story.
10 backup discs with data on 315,000 patients, including 228,000 Social Security numbers and protected health information on all 315,000 patients, missing from storage
April 18 2012
Stolen computer equipment contained patient insurance information
Two incidents involving web exposure of e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and signatures
Candidate for student body president may have stolen 700 students' userids and passwords in election voting
A one-line software patent – and a fix
I have been waiting for this day for 17 years! Today, United States Patent 5,404,140 titled “Coding system” owned by Mitsubishi expires, 22 years after it was filed in Japan.
Why the excitement? Well, 17 years ago, I wrote JBIG-KIT, a free and open-source implementation of JBIG1, the image compression algorithm used in all modern fax machines. My software is about 4000 lines of code long (in C), and only one single “if” statement in it is covered by the above patent:
if (s->a < lsz) { s->c += s->a; s->a = lsz; }
And sadly, there was no way to implement a JBIG1 encoder or decoder without using this patented line of code (in some form) while remaining compatible with all other JBIG1 implementations out there.
For the technically interested: JBIG1 uses an arithmetic coder that estimates the probability that the next pixel to be encoded is either black or white (taking into account 10 previously transmitted neighbour pixels). Arguably in the interest of saving a bit of RAM in hardware implementations, the standard does not use the simple arithmetic expression that estimates these pixel probabilities based on counts of how often a pixel has been black or white before in that context: p(next pixel is white) = (#white pixel so far + 1) / (#pixels so far + 1). Instead, it defines a finite-state machine that comes up with a cruder estimate, using just 7 bits to define 113 states, rather than actually counting pixels with 32-bit registers. IBM had a patent on that finite-state machine, which is really hardly more than an obfuscated counter. Then a Mitsubishi employee noticed that the crude IBM approximation sometimes ended up assigning to the “less probable pixel colour” a probability larger than 0.5, making it actually more probable. So they suggested the above if-statement to swap the probability estimates of the two colours in those rare cases, leading to a tiny improvement in coding efficiency.
Not only is the tiny improvement patented by Mitsubishi pretty trivial, it would also have been utterly unnecessary if IBM hadn’t first used in the standard a patented, but defect, finite state machine, rather than a simple counting process. But standards committees have little incentives to minimize the impact of patents on their products. On the contrary. The standardization of file formats and computer protocols turned in the late 1980s into a very nasty game: every participant is now mainly interested in squeezing as many of their patented ideas into the resulting standard as possible. The JBIG1 standard is a good example of a technology that could have been made much simpler and a bit more efficient if the authors hadn’t had to justify to their employers the time spent on developing the standard with the prospect that users of the standard would have to pay licence fees.
The underlying problem is compatibility. If I had to implement an image compression technique, I could have come up with something much simpler than JBIG1, which may have required slightly more RAM, but would have been much easier to understand and possibly even compress slightly better. However, the result would have been incompatible with what international standards bodies had already agreed would have to be implemented in every new fax machine on the planet.
I had once hoped that JBIG-KIT would help with the exchange of scanned documents on the Internet, facilitate online inter-library loan, and make paper archives more accessible to users all over the world. However, the impact was minimal: no web browser dared to directly support a standardized file format covered by 23 patents, the last of which expired today.
About 25 years ago, large IT research organizations discovered standards as a gold mine, a vehicle to force users to buy patent licenses, not because the technology is any good, but because it is required for compatibility. This is achieved by writing the standards very carefully such that there is no way to come up with a compatible implementation that does not require a patent license, an art that has been greatly perfected since. The IT standards landscape is now littered with golden patent monsters, whose complexity and use of exotic techniques is hardly justifiable by technical benefits, e.g. radio communications standards and storage formats. Even the utterly archaic MS-DOS VFAT file system used on every USB memory stick still makes its inventors money, not because it has any inherent benefits, but simply because its patent owner made sure that their market-dominant operating system lacked support for any of the many simpler and more elegant alternative file systems that support long filenames without requiring a patent licence.
Thanks to the perverse marriage of patents and the standardization of computer file formats and network protocols, patents have now the opposite effect of what they were originally introduced for. Patents were meant to protect investors, such that they could justify the often large investment necessary to introduce a new technology on the market. The idea was to encourage innovation. In the field of standardized file formats and computer protocols, patents are now the main hindrance. Ideas that require hardly any measurable investment to be invented or implemented (a single “if” statement in a program!) earn more than 20 years of government-guaranteed monopolistic protection.
There is a simple solution: amend patent legislation such that no patent licenses have to be obtained solely for the purpose of compatibility. No patent licence should be required by law if a technology is used solely to enable communication with another information-technology product. I believe this would eliminate instantly the enormous threat that patents now pose to the progress of standardization and improved interoperability in our networked information society, without imposing unrealistic expectations on the process of examining and granting patents.
The practice of limiting the protection of a right holder to enable competitors “to achieve the interoperability of an independently created program with other programs” (EU Directive 2009/24/EC) has already been common practice in copyright legislation worldwide for many years.
It is time that we fix patent law in just the same way!
April 17 2012
E-mail attachment error exposed 258 students' GPA's to class president, who, not realizing error, forwarded it on to all 258 seniors
Web design error exposed 20 competition entrants' names, dates of birth, and contact details via url manipulation
Briefcase stolen from social worker's home contained sensitive details on 18 child protection cases
Malware inserted on system exfiltrated customers' credit and debit card numbers
IT consultant whose firm worked for various firms in FL allegedly stole some of their employees' identify info for credit card fraud. He also allegedly stole SSN and names from FAA pilots' licenses provided to his father's business
April 16 2012
Databases with usernames and plain-text passwords, e-mail addresses and IP addresses dumped on the Internet; zipped archive includes a marriage license database and e-mail correspondence
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